Hamas' contradictory voices, By Menachem Klein*), Haaretz, 1 June 2006
The political texts of Hamas indicate that at present the organization is not fundamentalist. For the fundamentalist everything is a matter of principle; he does not distinguish between tactics and strategy. He is certainly incapable of changing his position. But it should be emphasized that Hamas is not a moderate movement, but a radical one. It has a variety of voices, some of them
contradictory. The radical voices are familiar enough, but we should get to know the others as well.
The Hamas leadership was aware of the organizational and ideological price it would have to pay in exchange for full politicization. It decided to put its senior leaders on the list of candidates. It preferred to moderate its discourse as an 'entrance fee' to politics, rather than leaving the heads of the movement outside the political swamp so they could maintain ideological purity.
The Islamic charter was not revoked by Hamas, but one cannot ignore the failure to mention it in any of the movement's political texts. That is no small thing when one considers the constitutive status of the charter: It indicates a silent admission of the contradiction between
the charter and Hamas' other political documents. The latter differ from the charter - first, because most of them are operational rather than theological. Second, they acknowledge the gap between the original positions of the organization and the national consensus and structure of Palestinian society. Third, the political declarations tend to transfer the burden of truth to the Israeli court, to ease the difficulty of making a change. Why torment oneself with a change of position if there is no Israeli partner? Fourth, the texts focus on the 1967 territories. Finally, they emphasize a variety of issues, in contrast to the one-dimensional nature of the Islamic charter.
Hamas' language is practical as opposed to the high-flown language of the charter, which is full of citations from the Koran; indeed the charter's time dimension is super-historical: The present is not legitimate, unless it is linked to the past and reconstructs it. The constitution that appears in the charter is the Koran, and death in the name of Allah is its most exalted ambition.
None of this appears in the movement's party platform, for example. Nor does the platform specify a desire to establish a Muslim state, which appears in the charter. The latter deals entirely with warfare, whereas the platform concentrates on the existing reality in Palestinian society. The term 'jihad' appears in it only once - in reference to the equality of women in holy wars. The Islamic charter relegates women to traditional roles as mothers who raise fighters and run the household, whereas the platform speaks of gender equality. It also declares opposition to normalization with Israel, an end to security cooperation with it and the use of any means
to fight occupation. Thus the formulators of the platform chose only to hint at the armed struggle, and left an opening for legitimizing the political track.
As opposed to the charter, which relates only to religious education and knowledge of the enemy in order to fight him effectively, Hamas' party platform confirms that the Palestinian orientation is toward acquisition of higher, Western-style education and specifies a preference for the field of technology - while distinguishing between Western values, which are unacceptable, and Western technology, which is worth adopting. Since the 18th century, this distinction has failed to stop Westernization and secularization, and the need to make it now testifies to the absence of a better alternative.
Hamas is thus trying to close the door of home and family to the influences of the public space, which is hard to change. The values of Islam must dominate the cultural entity that passes the historical heritage on to the next generation, as opposed to secular and Western society, in which the family and its head lose their position and authority in favor of the street and mass culture.
In the legal realm, the platform stated that shari'a (Islamic religious law) should become the main source for legislation. Thus Hamas decided to reject the magic fundamentalist slogan 'Islam is the solution' - which calls for imposing all of shari'a here and now - and instead to support a version that is acceptable to non-Islamic regimes in Arab countries.
Hamas' political discourse is full of contradictory voices. Alongside declarations that the movement will not recognize Israel, its spokesmen present an opposite position as well. The relatively moderate voices suggest distinguishing between means and ends, and see negotiations as a technique rather than as something that is essential - in which case giving in with respect to them would be considered a humiliating surrender.
The spokesmen distinguish between different types of negotiations - a final status solution, an interim or partial solution, and a continuation of the cease-fire. For them there is no basic problem with discussing partial and temporary arrangements with Israel, as well as solutions for ongoing problems such as transit permits for workers and goods. There is certainly no problem with a continuation of the lull in the fighting, on condition that it is mutual. And there is nothing to prevent the Fatah people from renewing talks concerning a final status agreement with Israel, and proving whether their way produces results different from what has been accomplished already.
The main hesitation here involves the question of whether Hamas itself is permitted to conduct talks concerning a solution to the conflict with Israel - and under what conditions. The 'red line' of the pragmatic approach is determined according to the results of negotiations. On the other hand, the extremists believe that holding direct talks constitutes recognition of Israel and that the withdrawal will be achieved by negotiating with a third party. Because of the differences in opinion, the spokesmen for the pragmatic approach emphasize that there will be no surrender of the Palestinian right to the 1948 territories, of the right of return of all refugees, of complete withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967, including in Jerusalem, of the release of all prisoners, and of the destruction of the separation fence.
Hamas' view of the right of return stands in contradiction to the Arab League's peace plan. This principle contradicts the belief of the Arab world as being the 'strategic depth' of the Palestinian entity. Hamas has no answer to this problem, and is wondering how to accept the Arab plan.
In the international political lexicon, the end of the occupation, to which Hamas often refers, means a two-state solution and the end of the occupation of the 1967 territories. But what is Hamas actually referring to - the end of the occupation of these territories, or the end of the occupation of the 1948 territories, as stated in the Islamic charter? Is the occupation essential to Israel, and does the end of the occupation require the political elimination of Israel?
This question is related to another one: To what degree does de-facto Palestinian self-definition (as opposed to its historical ties) coincide with the 1967 territories only? The answer lies in the context in which Hamas places the term 'self-definition'. For the most part, it refers to an arrangement that deals with the 1967 territories, which is attached to a statement regarding the link to the 1948 territories.
Hamas' leaders were not accustomed to using the word 'peace'. The first to make hesitant use of it was Khaled Meshal in Moscow. It was expressed with greater commitment by Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh when he presented his government in parliament, and by Foreign Minister Mahmoud Al-Zahar in his letter to the UN secretary-general.
The violent clashes and the serious political struggle with Fatah - which is trying to maintain its remaining strength in the government and to dictate to Hamas the foreign policy of the Palestine Liberation Organization - are now making it difficult for Hamas to become moderate, and are pushing it into isolation from Fatah by means of a series of red lines. In the absence of an Israeli partner for Fatah's peace efforts, PA Chair Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) has been weakened. This could lead to an outcome opposite of what Israel is expecting: a continuation of fluctuations in Hamas and its acceptance of the Arab peace plan.
*) Prof. Menachem Klein is an expert on the Middle East who teaches at Bar-Ilan University and is one of the signers of the Geneva Initiative.
Source:
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/722037.html
